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Why do people sometimes struggle with decisions that once seemed relatively simple?  
This research suggests that comparing options leads people to lose sight of which decision 
attributes are important. Although the difference between important and unimportant attributes is 
often clear in the abstract, the act of making tradeoffs highlights what people must forgo on one 
attribute in exchange for a gain on another, which increases the perceived importance of trivial 
attributes in particular. This causes the variance in perceived importance across attributes to 
shrink, blurring the distinction between important and unimportant attributes. Four experiments 
demonstrate this phenomenon, explore the underlying mechanism, and show how it leads to 
increased choice difficulty and dissatisfaction with the choice experience.  
 
Keywords: multi-attribute choice models, decision difficulty, tradeoffs, distortion, 
conjoint analysis   
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Consumer choice is often difficult and fraught with conflict and uncertainty.  One simple 
reason for such difficulty is tradeoffs.  Whether deciding which flight to purchase, which house 
to buy, or even which entrée to order, choice options are often described by various attributes 
(e.g., price, tastiness, healthiness).  Further, in most decisions preferences for different attributes 
conflict. Most consumers prefer flights with fewer connections, for example, but they also prefer 
cheaper flights, and direct flights are often more expensive.  Similarly, most consumers prefer 
tastier food, but they also generally want to be healthy, and taste and health are often negatively 
correlated.  Not surprisingly then, a great deal of research has shown that tradeoffs often produce 
negative emotions (Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999), increase difficulty and conflict (Chatterjee 
and Heath 1996), and lead to choice deferral (Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Tversky and Shafir 1992). 
In addition, however, we suggest that the mere act of tradeoff-making itself can produce 
further difficulty: Making tradeoffs can lead people to lose sight of which decision attributes are 
important, which, in turn, makes choice even more difficult. When choosing a flight, for 
example, most people would agree a priori that price and number of connections are more 
important than beverage or in-flight movie selection. But while such differences in attribute 
importance seem clear in the abstract, we argue that the act of making tradeoffs often muddies 
the distinction.  In particular, we suggest that making tradeoffs among options reduces the 
variance in perceived attribute importance (i.e., difference between important and unimportant 
attributes) by making relatively unimportant attributes seem more important. This convergence 
of attribute importance, in turn, increases choice difficulty, uncertainty, and frustration. 
We suggest this effect is driven by the focus that tradeoff making engenders. Making 
tradeoffs involves considering differences in attribute levels across options, which leads people 
to focus on within attribute comparisons (e.g., how much better one in-flight movie selection is 
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than another) and less on between attributes comparisons (e.g., whether in-flight movie selection 
is as important as ticket price). Consequently, attribute hierarchy becomes less salient. Moreover, 
the fact that there are tradeoffs (i.e., things to forego) within each attribute increases the 
perceived importance of even unimportant attributes, making all the attributes seem equally 
important, rather than equally unimportant.  
In the next sections, we develop hypotheses about how tradeoff-making affects perceived 
attribute importance, decision difficulty, and satisfaction from the decision process. Four 
experiments test these hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings 
for choice difficulty, decision making, and well-being. 
 
ATTRIBUTE IMPORTANCE WEIGHTS AND CHOICE 
 
Product attributes play a key role in consumer decision making (Dhar, Nowlis, and 
Sherman 1999). Consumers compare specifications when buying electronics, contrast benefits 
when selecting services, and examine product features when choosing household goods.  Models 
of attitude and preference formation (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) have long emphasized the role of 
attributes, and the importance weights assigned to them, as determinants of evaluation and 
choice. Indeed, normatively accurate decision strategies, such as weighted averaging and equal 
weights (Bettman et al. 1998; Frisch and Clemen 1994; Green and Srinivasan 1990), use attribute 
levels and importance weights to predict choice.  In such models, consumers pick the option with 
the highest aggregate value, where an option’s value is determined by its attribute levels, 
multiplied by the corresponding attribute weight and summed across all attributes. 
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Factoring-in the values of all possible attributes, however, puts unrealistic demands on 
consumers’ working memory and computational resources (Montgomery 1983). Consequently, 
people often use simplifying decision strategies, such as focusing only on the most important 
attributes and ignoring (or deferring) the less important ones (Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson 1988; Svenson, Edland, and Slovic 1990; Tversky 1972; see Bettman et 
al. 1998 for a review).   
As a result, the ability to discern between important and less important decision attributes 
plays a crucial role in reducing decision overload. Determining which attributes are important is 
akin to setting priorities, which simplifies the decision by enabling consumers to focus on a 
relatively small number of attributes, reduce tradeoff conflict (Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999; 
Schrift, Netzer, and Kivetz 2011; Tversky and Shafir 1992), and employ simple, non-
compensatory choice strategies (Bettman et al. 1998).  Discerning between important and 
unimportant attributes leads to clearer, more polarized and confident preferences, whereas lack 
of differentiation has the opposite effect (Chernev 1997; Yoon and Simonson 2008). 
Importantly, however, attribute weights are malleable, and can be constructed, modified, 
or distorted during the decision process.  For example, decision makers tend to assign more 
weight to attributes that are easier to evaluate (Hsee 1996; Kivetz and Simonson 2000; Nowlis 
and Simonson 1997) or unique to the focal option in the comparison (Dhar et al. 1999). Attribute 
weight distortion can also be driven by the desire to identify a dominance structure among the 
options (Montgomery 1983), to favor the already preferred option (Brownstein 2003; Chernev 
2001; Klayman 1995; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Russo, Meloy, and Medvec 1998), or to 
complicate the decision when it feels too easy (Schrift et al. 2011).     
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THE CURRENT RESEARCH  
 
Building on the idea that attribute weights are malleable, we propose that the mere act of 
making tradeoffs across product attributes can systematically influence perceived attribute 
importance.   
Outside a comparison context, people have a general notion of how important different 
attributes are.  Most travelers, for example, care a lot about how many connections their flight 
will take and much less about the type of on-board entertainment offered.   
But we suggest that comparing options containing tradeoffs tends to increase the 
perceived importance of attributes that consumers would otherwise judge to be unimportant. The 
resulting shrinkage of attribute importance variance, in turn, should increase choice difficulty, 
uncertainty, and frustration with the decision. 
Our proposition is based on the premise that, when comparing multi-attribute options, 
people spontaneously focus on comparable decision elements, like values within a given attribute 
(e.g., “this restaurant has free parking but that one doesn’t”), because they are easy to evaluate 
(Hsee 1996; Markman and Gentner 1993; Simonson 2008). This comes at the expense of less 
salient or less evaluable comparisons across attributes. The focus on within-attribute 
comparisons means that importance differences between attributes may be neglected. 
But beyond merely increasing attention to within-attribute comparisons at the expense of 
between-attribute comparisons, tradeoffs, by definition, highlight what people must give up on 
one attribute in exchange for a gain on another attribute. We argue that this focus on the forgone 
underscores potential losses on each attribute (Brenner, Rottenstreich, and Sood 1999; Carmon 
and Ariely 2000; Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg 2003) which, as a result, may “loom 
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larger” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Namely, the fact that there is something to forgo (i.e., 
lose) on an attribute may increase the extent to which it is perceived as consequential and hence 
the importance weight of that attribute (Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Zeelenberg et al. 1996).  
The focus on perceived losses that tradeoff-making engenders should have a particularly 
pronounced effect on relatively unimportant (versus important) attributes. This is because an 
increase in perceived importance has a greater marginal effect on unimportant attributes than on 
important ones (Meyer and Sathi 1985; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Sela and Berger 2012b). 
The result is overall convergence of attribute importance weights. While it may not change how 
people see the unimportant attributes in general, in the moment these attributes may come to be 
seen as more important. And although the unimportant attributes may still be less important in 
absolute terms, the relative increase in their perceived importance makes them less likely to be 
ignored or deferred in the decision process, thereby hindering decision simplification strategies 
and increasing decision complexity and effort as discussed above (Bettman et al. 1998; Tversky 
1972). 
In sum, we propose that making tradeoffs among choice options should shrink attribute 
variance by making relatively unimportant attributes more important. This, in turn, should lead 
decision makers to consider additional attributes, thereby complicating the decision and 
increasing choice difficulty and uncertainty. Further, we hypothesize that the effect of tradeoff-
making on attribute variance is driven by the increased focus on within-attribute comparisons 
and the perception of losses that tradeoff-making engenders. Specifically, we predict that 
decreased loss aversion should attenuate the effect of tradeoff-making on attribute importance 
variance.   
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We test our propositions in four experiments.  In Experiment 1, we examine how making 
tradeoffs among attributes impacts attribute importance variance by boosting the perceived 
importance of relatively unimportant attributes. Experiment 1 also examines the detrimental 
downstream consequences of attribute importance variance shrinkage on decision difficulty and 
certainty. Experiment 2 directly tests the role of within-attribute comparisons in this effect and 
rules out alternative explanations. Experiment 3 manipulates loss aversion to test the underlying 
role of perceived losses. Finally, Experiment 4 provides additional support for our theory by 
examining the moderating role of construal level. Our theory suggests that the effect of tradeoff-
making should be more pronounced when people focus on low-level aspects of the decision 
rather than the “big picture”, and attenuated when they maintain a high-level, goal-directed 
notion of what is important in the decision.   
Importantly, we argue that attribute weight convergence is not simply an artifact of the 
additional information that comparisons provide regarding the sacrifices one has to make. We 
demonstrate this by examining how moderators that increase within-attribute tradeoffs and 
decrease sensitivity to losses influence the effect, even when all the information is held constant.     
 
EXPERIMENT 1: COMPARISONS MUDDY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMPORTANT 
AND UNIMPORTANT ATTRIBUTES 
 
Experiment 1 has three main goals. First, it tests whether comparing multi-attribute 
options reduces the variance in perceived attribute importance weights. We ask people to rate 
how important different decision attributes are either before or after they begin comparing the 
options.  While people can easily distinguish between important and less important product 
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attributes in general, we predict that comparing options containing tradeoffs should muddy that 
distinction. 
Second, Experiment 1 examines our suggestion that this attribute importance 
convergence is driven by less important attributes becoming more important (rather than more 
important attributes becoming less important).  
Third, it examines the negative downstream consequences of this effect.  We test how 
shrinking attribute variance impacts decision ease, choice certainty, and decision satisfaction. 
 
Method 
One hundred and two participants (mean age = 35; 59% women) were recruited from an 
online nationwide pool of people who had indicated they were interested in participating in 
psychological studies. They were randomly assigned to one of two between-subject conditions 
which were identical except for task order (rate-attributes-first vs. compare-options-first).  
Participants were asked to imagine buying a domestic flight ticket. In the rate-attributes-
first condition, participants first indicated how important each of six attributes (flight duration, 
number of stops, baggage fee, price, airport distance, and aircraft comfort level) would be for 
them when buying a flight ticket (1 = extremely unimportant; 7 = extremely important). To 
ensure that there would be no information differences between the order conditions, the available 
range of levels within each attribute was provided in parentheses (e.g., “Number of Stops (range: 
0 – 2)”). After rating attribute importance, participants in the rate-attributes-first condition saw 
four options, one in each column, described on the same six attributes they rated previously, one 
in each row. The options contained tradeoffs among the attributes (e.g., a longer flight departing 
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from a convenient airport versus a shorter flight from a less convenient airport). See Appendix 
A. 
In the compare-options-first condition, however, participants first saw the flight options 
and were asked to evaluate them carefully (without making a selection yet). After examining the 
options, they rated the importance of each attribute, using the same measure described above.  
The focal dependent variable was the variance among individual attributes’ importance 
ratings. After comparing and rating (or vice-verse), all participants chose their preferred option.   
To examine the downstream consequences, we also measured decision ease, certainty, 
and overall satisfaction. At the end of the study, participants rated the extent to which it was 
difficult to think about which option to choose (reverse coded), the extent to which they felt that 
one of the options fitted them better than others, how satisfying the evaluation was, and how 
certain they were about being able to find the best option. These were aggregated to construct an 
index of decision satisfaction (α = .85).  
  
Results 
Effect on attribute importance variance. A one-way ANOVA revealed that compared to 
the rate-attributes-first condition, comparing the options first reduced attribute importance 
variance (MCompare = 1.62 vs. MRate = 2.34; F(1, 100) = 7.21, p < .01).  
To further test what was driving this effect, we ran a 2 (Task Order) x 2 (Attribute Type: 
unimportant vs. important) repeated-measures ANOVA on the least and most important 
attributes, based on each respondent’s idiosyncratic ratings. The analysis revealed the predicted 
interaction (F(1, 100) = 8.37, p < .005). Specifically, compared to rating the attributes first, 
comparing the options first increased the importance of the least important attribute (MCompare = 
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3.16 vs. MRate = 2.58, F(1, 100) = 4.02, p < .05) but had no effect on the most important attribute 
(MCompare = 6.06 vs. MRate = 6.26, F < 1, ns). Note that these results are inconsistent with a ceiling 
effect explanation for the lack of movement on the important attributes, because ratings of 
important attributes were actually slightly (though nonsignificantly) lower in the compare-
options-first condition (6.06) than in the rate-attributes-first condition (6.26). Further, consistent 
with the notion that a ceiling effect was not responsible for the lack of movement on the 
important attributes, ratings of the second and third most important attributes did not vary either 
as a function of task order (5.72 vs. 5.58 and 5.16 vs. 5.04, respectively, all F < .4, ns), despite 
the fact that these were farther away from the high end of the scale.  
Decision satisfaction. We also examined the downstream consequences of this effect for 
decision satisfaction. Consistent with our prediction, a one-way ANOVA on the decision 
satisfaction index revealed that comparing the options first decreased decision satisfaction 
(MCompare = 4.83 vs. MRate = 5.51; F(1, 100) = 6.35, p < .02).  
Mediation analysis. Finally, we conducted a multi-stage mediation analysis to examine 
whether (1) the effect of task order on attribute variance was mediated by an increase in the 
ratings of unimportant attributes (but not important ones), and (2) this, in turn, mediated the 
effect of task order on decision satisfaction. Thus task order  unimportant attribute rating  
overall attribute variance decision satisfaction. 
Our mediation analysis relied on the bootstrapping approach and SPSS macro that Hayes 
(2012) developed. Bootstrapping results with 5000 samples and a 95% confidence interval (in 
brackets) suggested that the indirect effect of rating order on decision satisfaction, through 
unimportant attribute ratings and overall attribute importance variance, was significant (B = -.13, 
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[-.36,  -.01]). A similar analysis examining whether the important attributes mediated the effect 
suggested that this was not the case (B = -.01, [-.07, .01]). 
 
Discussion 
Results of Experiment 1 support our proposition regarding how comparisons shrink 
attribute variance and illustrate the negative downstream consequences of this effect.  
First, compared to when people first considered the attributes, considering tradeoffs 
among options that included these attributes blurred the distinction between more and less 
important attributes. This increased difficulty and uncertainty, and decreased overall decision 
satisfaction.   
Second, the results indicate that this effect is driven by changes in unimportant attributes.  
Considering tradeoffs increased the perceived importance of the relatively unimportant 
attributes, but had no effect on more important attributes. While the unimportant attributes were 
still rated as less important in absolute terms, comparing the options reduced their difference 
from the more important attributes, making the unimportant attributes less likely to be ignored or 
deferred in the decision process.  
A follow-up study further illustrates that comparing options leads people to consider 
more attributes. Participants (N = 69) either rated four flight attributes first and then compared 
the options and chose, as in Experiment 1, or compared the options and chose without rating the 
attributes at all. After entering their choice, we asked all the participants to indicate which of the 
four attributes influenced their decision, using a binary response (yes vs. no) for each attribute. 
Consistent with our theory, whereas only 5.6% of participants in the rate-attributes-first 
condition considered more than two attributes, this increased to 27.3% in the compare-options-
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first condition, who considered at least three of the four attributes (χ2(1) = 6.06, p < .05). This 
supports our proposition that tradeoffs make less important attributes less likely to be ignored or 
deferred, thereby complicating the decision and requiring more effort. 
While the results of Experiment 1 support our conceptualization, one might wonder 
whether they were somehow driven by the rate-attributes-first condition itself, rather than by 
tradeoffs in the compare-options-first condition. It is also possible that rating attributes versus 
comparing options triggers a different evaluative mindset (e.g., affective versus cognitive, 
abstract versus concrete, or heuristic versus deliberative). One might also wonder if the effects 
were driven by the additional information provided prior to attribute rating in the compare-
options-first condition. Participants in both conditions were given information about the range of 
levels within each attribute, but one could argue that actually seeing the choice set provided new 
information. We designed Experiment 2 to rule out these alternative accounts. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2: THE IMPORTANCE OF WITHIN-ATTRIBUTE TRADEOFF MAKING 
 
To rule out alternative accounts due to the differences between the rate-attributes-first 
and compare-options-first conditions, and to directly test the underlying role of within-attribute 
comparisons in tradeoff making, Experiment 2 keeps the information between conditions the 
same but uses a layout manipulation shown to produce a within-attribute focus (Wen and Lurie 
2010).  
All participants were shown the same four options, one in each column, described by the 
same four attributes, one in each row (i.e., all participants viewed a version of the compare-
options-first condition). But conditions varied based on which comparisons were highlighted. In 
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the by-attribute condition we highlighted the within-attribute information by drawing a 
horizontal box around each attribute row. In the by-option condition we highlighted the within-
option information by drawing a vertical box around each option.  We also had a control 
condition where no highlighting was used.  If the effect is driven by within-attribute 
comparisons, as we suggest, then accentuating such comparisons (i.e., the by-attribute condition) 
should shrink attribute variance. 
Experiment 2 also investigates the generalizability of these effects, testing them across 
three different product categories.  
 
Method 
Two hundred and sixty two participants (mean age = 31; 55% women) were recruited 
from an online nationwide pool of people who had indicated they were interested in participating 
in psychological studies. They were randomly assigned to a condition in a 3 (Focus of 
Comparison: by-attribute vs. by-option vs. control) x 3 (Product Category: flights vs. restaurants 
vs. toothbrushes) between subjects design.  
Participants chose between four options in one of the three product categories. The 
options, one in each column, were described by four attributes, one in each row. The attributes 
for each product category were as follows: flights (price, number of connections, in-flight 
entertainment availability, and food and beverage availability), restaurants (wait time, food 
rating, outdoor seating availability, and wine selection), and toothbrushes (bristle quality rating, 
durability in months, color availability, and ergonomic design availability). The options 
contained tradeoffs on all four attributes.  Before making their choice, participants were asked to 
rate how important each attribute was to them (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important).  
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 In addition to varying product category, we also manipulated which comparisons were 
highlighted (adapted from Wen and Lurie, 2010, see Appendix B). In the by-attribute condition, 
a horizontal box was drawn around each row, highlighting the values within the same attribute 
across options.  In the by-option condition, a vertical box was drawn around each option, 
highlighting the values within each option across the different attributes.  In the control condition 
no boxes were used.  
 
Results 
Effect of comparison focus on attribute importance variance. The results bolster our 
suggestion that making trade-offs within attributes leads people to lose sight of which attributes 
are more important. A 3 (Focus of Comparison) x 3 (Product Category) ANOVA on attribute 
importance variance revealed the predicted main effect of comparison focus (F(2, 253) = 7.24, p 
< .001). Product category did not interact with focus of comparison (F < 1, ns) and is not 
discussed further.  
Pairwise comparisons indicated the by-attribute manipulation had the predicted effect on 
attribute importance variance. Encouraging within attribute comparison (i.e., through the 
horizontal layout) reduced attribute variance compared to either the control (MBy-Attribute = 2.83 
vs. MControl = 4.24; t = 3.18, p < .005) or by-option condition (MBy-Attribute = 2.83 vs. MBy-Option = 
3.99; t = 2.59, p < .01).  There was no difference in variance between the control and vertical 
layout (i.e., by-option) conditions (MControl = 4.24 vs. MBy-Option = 3.99; t = .56, ns).1  
                                                 
1 While one could expect attribute variance to be higher in the by-option condition compared to 
the control, this would imply that participants in that condition should make even fewer within-
attribute comparisons. Given the salience of attribute information, however, it may be difficult to 
completely move people away from the tendency to consider the attributes at least somewhat.   
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We also examined whether the effect was driven by changes in the most important versus 
unimportant attribute, based on each respondent’s idiosyncratic ratings. A 3 (Focus of 
Comparison) x 2 (Attribute Importance: unimportant versus important) repeated measures 
analysis on the least important and most important attribute means revealed a comparison focus x 
attribute importance interaction (F(2, 259) = 4.45, p < .02), see figure 1. Specifically, compared 
to the control and by-option conditions, the by-attribute condition increased the perceived 
importance of the unimportant attribute (MBy-Attribute = 3.17; MControl = 2.37; MBy-Option = 2.59; F(2, 
259) = 5.32, p < .005), but not the important attribute (MBy-Attribute = 6.42; MControl = 6.43; MBy-
Option = 6.26; F < 1.2, ns).  
Mediation analysis. Mediation analysis (Hayes 2012) provides further support for our 
conceptualization. Bootstrapping analysis with 5000 samples and a 95% confidence interval (in 
brackets) shows that the effect of comparison focus on attribute importance variance was 
mediated by change in the unimportant attributes (B = -.493, [-.88, -.12]) but not by change in 
the important attributes (B = .138, [-.07, .36]).  
 
Insert figure 1 about here
 
Discussion 
In addition to illustrating that these results generalize to multiple product domains, 
Experiment 2 provides evidence for the underlying process behind the attribute importance 
convergence effect. Specifically, compared to a control condition, or a layout that highlighted 
by-option evaluation, highlighting within-attribute comparisons shrank attribute variance. This 
underscores the notion that within-attribute comparisons drive attribute importance variance to 
shrink.   
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 Experiment 2 also casts doubt on alternative explanations. Even when the information 
provided to participants was identical across conditions, encouraging people to focus on within-
attribute tradeoffs led to attribute variance shrinkage. Focusing on the comparison condition also 
shows that the effect cannot be solely due to mindset differences between the rate-attributes-first 
and compare-options-first conditions in Experiment 1, such as a rating versus comparison 
mindset, affective versus cognitive evaluation, or heuristic versus deliberative processing. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3: THE UNDERLYING ROLE OF PERCEIVED LOSSES 
 
Experiment 3 tests the underlying role of perceived losses. We proposed that tradeoff-
making shrinks attribute importance variance because it makes people focus on what they must 
forgo (i.e., lose). This makes the unimportant attributes in particular “loom larger” (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979), while having a diminishing marginal impact on attributes that already seem 
important (Meyer and Sathi 1985; Nowlis and Simonson 1996). We test this process hypothesis 
using the experimental causal chain approach (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005), where the 
hypothesized mediator is directly manipulated rather than measured. Specifically, if perceived 
losses underlie the effect of tradeoffs on attribute importance variance, then a manipulation that 
decreases loss aversion, or the tendency to assign more weight to anticipated regrets (Zeelenberg 
et al. 1996), should attenuate the effect of tradeoff-making.    
We manipulated loss aversion using two paradigms validated in prior research. First, loss 
aversion decreases when people make choices for others rather than for themselves (Polman 
2012). Second, priming people to feel powerful reduces loss aversion specifically by decreasing 
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the perceived negative impact of losses (Inesi 2010). We predict that both of these manipulations 
should mitigate the effect of tradeoffs on attribute variance shrinkage. 
 
Method 
One hundred eighty eight participants (mean age = 37, 51% female), recruited from a 
nationwide online pool, were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (Task Order: rate-attributes-
first vs. compare-options-first) x 2 (Loss Aversion: baseline vs. attenuated) x 2 (Attenuation 
Paradigm: self/other vs. power) between subjects design. In all conditions, participants were told 
that they would be reviewing several flight options and that they would rate the importance of 
different attributes when choosing a flight. They evaluated the same flight options used in 
Experiment 2.  
First, we manipulated loss aversion using either choice for self versus other (Polman 
2012) or a power manipulation (Inesi 2010), depending on the paradigm condition. In the 
self/other paradigm condition, participants were asked to imagine choosing a flight for 
themselves (baseline condition) or a friend (attenuated loss aversion condition). In the power 
paradigm condition, half the participants described the last time they went to the grocery store 
(baseline condition) while the other half completed a power prime manipulation in which they 
described an incident where they had power over another individual (power condition, borrowed 
from Inesi 2010).  
Second, participants completed the focal decision making task. As in Experiment 1, the 
flight options were the same across conditions, and the only difference between conditions was 
the order in which the different stages of the task were presented. In the compare-options-first 
condition, participants were first shown four flight options and then rated how important each 
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attribute was to them when buying a flight ticket (1 = not at all important; 7 = extremely 
important). In the rate-attributes-first condition, participants rated the attributes at the outset, 
before seeing the options. We again included attribute level ranges in the rating task (in both 
order conditions), to minimize information differences between the conditions. All participants 
then selected their preferred option.  
Finally, participants in the power paradigm condition were probed regarding whether the 
first task influenced or seemed related to the second task. None of them was aware of any such 
influence or relationship.  
 
Results 
 Effect on attribute importance variance. A 2 (Task Order: rate-attributes-first vs. 
compare-options-first) x 2 (Loss-Aversion: baseline vs. attenuated) x 2 (Paradigm: self/other vs. 
power) ANOVA revealed a main effect of task order (F(1, 180) = 8.66, p < .005), which was 
qualified by the predicted task order x loss-aversion interaction (F(1, 180) = 4.19, p < .05), 
Figure 2. There were no interactions involving paradigm type (i.e., which manipulation of loss 
aversion was used, all Fs < 1, ns), so this variable is not discussed further. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, in the baseline condition (i.e., choice for self or grocery 
shopping prime), compared to rating the attributes first, comparing the options first reduced 
attribute importance variance (MCompare = 2.36vs. MRate = 4.36; F(1, 184) = 14.14, p < .001). In 
the attenuated loss-aversion condition (i.e., choice for other or power prime), however, this effect 
disappeared (MCompare = 3.92vs. MRate = 3.60; F < .3, ns). These results support our suggestion 
that the effect is driven by the focus on perceived losses that tradeoff-making engenders. 
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Looked at another way, in the compare-options-first condition, attribute importance 
variance was lower in the baseline than in the attenuated loss-aversion condition (MBaseline = 2.36 
vs. MAttenuated Loss = 3.60; F(1, 184) = 4.15, p < .05). There was no effect of loss aversion in the 
rate-attributes-first condition (MBaseline= 4.63 vs. MAttenuated Loss = 3.62; F < 1.3, ns).  
Next, we examined whether the effect in the baseline loss-aversion condition was driven 
by changes in the most important versus unimportant attribute, based on each respondent’s 
idiosyncratic ratings. A 2 (Task Order) x 2 (Attribute Type: Unimportant vs. Important) 
Repeated-Measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction (F(1, 97) = 11.15, p < .001). 
Specifically, compared to rating the attributes first, comparing the options first increased the 
perceived importance of the least important attribute (MCompare = 3.75 vs. MRate = 2.62, F(1, 97) = 
11.88, p < .001) but had no effect on the most important attribute (MCompare = 6.52 vs. MRate = 
6.60, F(1, 97) < .3, ns). Note that these results are again inconsistent with a mere ceiling effect 
explanation for the lack of movement on the important attributes, because ratings of important 
attributes were actually slightly (although nonsignificantly) lower in the compare-options-first 
condition (6.52) than in the rate-attributes-first condition (6.60). There were no corresponding 
effects in the attenuated loss-aversion condition (all Fs < 1.86, ns).  
 
Insert figure 2 about here
 
Mediation analysis. Finally, we used a simultaneous moderated mediation analysis to test 
whether either the unimportant or important attribute ratings mediate the effect of task order and 
loss-aversion on overall attribute importance variance. Bootstrapping analysis (Hayes 2012), 
using 5000 samples and a 95% confidence interval (in brackets), indicates that the indirect effect 
of task order on attribute importance variance was mediated by the unimportant attributes in the 
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baseline loss-aversion condition (B = -1.77, [-2.76, -.77]) but not in the attenuated loss-aversion 
condition (B = -.69, [-1.69, .32]). Important attributes did not mediate the effect in any condition 
(B = -.12, [-.60, .35], and B = .01, [-.34, .34], respectively).   
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 demonstrates the underlying role of perceived losses in this effect. As in 
Experiment 1, comparing the options first shrank attribute importance variance compared to 
rating the attributes first.  This shrinkage disappeared, however, when participants completed one 
of two tasks known to attenuate loss-aversion (Inesi 2010; Polman 2012). This provides strong 
evidence that the effect of task order on attribute importance variance is driven by perceptions of 
loss that tradeoff-making engenders. Further, the fact that two different loss aversion 
manipulations had the same effect increases the construct validity and generalizability of this 
finding.  
The results also rule out two alternative accounts. First, an information-based alternative 
account cannot account for the effect of loss aversion. Even though participants saw identical 
decision stimuli across all the compare-first conditions, loss aversion still moderated the effect. 
Further, the fact that loss aversion only played a role in the compare-options-first condition, 
underscores the notion that loss perceptions are evoked by the tradeoffs, which, in turn, drive our 
effect.   
The results so far are inconsistent with a preference bolstering explanation: whereas a 
bolstering explanation predicts that attribute distortion should decrease decision difficulty, our 
findings show that it increased difficulty. Moreover, a bolstering account implies that attribute 
distortion should favor the preferred option, and that participants should strive to polarize (i.e., 
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increase the difference) between the best and second favorite options (Montgomery and Svenson 
1983), to reduce conflict. Ancillary analyses show that neither occurred. For each participant, we 
calculated a predicted utility score for each option and examined whether they actually chose the 
option with the highest score2. A logistic regression on actual vs. predicted choice matching 
revealed no effect of either task order or loss aversion condition and no interaction (all χ2(1) < 
1.62, ns). Moreover, neither factor impacted the difference in utility score between the best and 
second favorite options (all F(1, 184) < 1, ns). This overall pattern of results is inconsistent with 
a preference bolstering explanation and underscores the maladaptive nature of our effect.  
 
EXPERIMENT 4: THE ROLE OF CONSTRUAL LEVEL 
 
We have suggested that comparing options shrinks attribute importance variance in part 
because people tend to focus on local decision elements (i.e., within-attribute tradeoffs) and lose 
sight of the “big picture” (i.e., what attributes are actually important).  If this is truly the case, 
then helping consumers maintain a high-level sense of their priorities (e.g., is price or number of 
connections more important?) should attenuate the effect. Experiment 4 tests this possibility by 
examining whether construal level moderates our effect (Trope and Liberman 2010). 
Further, low-level (versus high-level) construal increases consumer tradeoff-making 
(Khan, Zhu, and Kalra 2011). Consequently, showing that attribute importance variance shrinks 
more under low- than high-level construal would provide further support for our suggestion that 
tradeoff-making underlies these effects.  
                                                 
2 First, we coded each attribute value on an ordinal scale (e.g., $450 = 1, $380 = 2, $360 = 3, $310 = 4). Then, for 
each participant, we multiplied each ordinal attribute value for each option by the attribute importance rating 
assigned to it, and summed across attributes to determine that option’s overall utility score (cf. Schrift et al. 2011). 
Validating this utility score, participants were 55% more likely than chance to select the option with the highest 
score (χ2(1) = 9.38, p = .002).  
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Experiment 4 also tests an alternative account based solely on construal level.  We argue 
that low-level construal increases within-attribute tradeoff-making, but one could argue that the 
compare-options-first condition itself activates a low level construal, which directly impacts 
attribute variance regardless of tradeoff-making. This alternative account would predict a main 
effect of construal level where priming low level construal by itself leads to lower attribute 
variance than does priming high level construal. In contrast, our theory predicts a task order by 
construal level interaction.  We test which occurs. 
Finally, Experiment 4 further examines the downstream consequences of attribute 
variance shrinkage for decision satisfaction.  
 
Method 
One hundred twenty four participants (mean age = 29, 53% female), recruited from a 
nationwide online pool, were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (Task Order: rate-attributes-
first vs. compare-options-first) x 2 (Construal Level: high vs. low) between subject design. 
Participants completed two purportedly unrelated tasks. In the first, we primed 
participants with either a high or a low level construal mindset using a procedure validated in 
prior research (Alter and Oppenheimer 2008; Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004). In the high 
(versus low) level construal condition, participants were asked to write a description of why 
(versus how) they might perform four everyday activities. 
Second, participants completed a decision making study identical to the one used in 
Experiment 3, in which they rated attribute importance either before or after comparing the 
choice options, and subsequently chose their preferred option. To measure downstream 
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consequences, participants answered the same questions relating to decision satisfaction as in 
Experiment 1 (averaged to form an index, α = .91). 
Probing participants revealed that none of them was aware of the relationship between 
the two tasks and none of them thought the first task influenced the second. 
 
Results  
 Effect on attribute importance variance. A 2 (task-order: compare-options-first vs. rate-
attributes-first) x 2 (construal level: high vs. low) ANOVA revealed only the predicted task order 
x construal interaction (F(1, 120) = 8.57, p < .005), see figure 3. Note that there was no main 
effect of the construal level manipulation (F < .1, ns), casting doubt on an alternative account 
based solely on construal level driving the effect. 
Instead, supporting our theorizing, under low-level construal, compared to rating the 
attributes first, comparing the options first decreased attribute importance variance (MRate = 6.90 
vs. MCompare = 4.26; F(1, 120) = 8.48, p < .005). There was no effect of task-order in the high-
level construal condition (MRate = 5.41 vs. MCompare = 6.31, F(1, 120) < 1.3, ns).  
Consistent with our prior studies, the effect in the low-level construal condition was 
driven by comparing options increasing the perceived importance of less important attributes. 
Specifically, a 2 (task order) x 2 (Attribute Importance: important vs. unimportant) repeated 
measures analysis revealed a task order x attribute importance interaction (F(1, 54) = 7.22, p < 
.01). Compared to rating the attributes first, comparing the options first increased the importance 
of the unimportant attribute (MRate = 1.71 vs. MCompare = 2.69; F(1, 54) = 4.52, p < .05). There 
was no significant effect, however, on the important attribute (MRate = 6.86 vs. MCompare = 6.46; 
F(1, 54) = 2.69, p = .11).  A similar ANOVA in the high-level construal condition revealed a 
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marginally significant decrease in the unimportant attribute, in the compare-options-first versus 
the rate-attributes-first condition (F(1, 66) = 2.86, p < .1 ), with no effects or interactions 
involving the important attribute (Fs < 2, ns). 
Effect on decision satisfaction. A task order x construal level ANOVA on the decision 
satisfaction index revealed the predicted interaction (F(1,120) = 8.90, p < .01).  Specifically, 
under low-level construal, comparing the options first decreased decision satisfaction (MCompare = 
5.01 vs. MRate = 5.73; F(1,120) = 4.84, p < .03). In the high-level construal condition, decision 
satisfaction was actually higher in the compare-options-first condition than the rate-attributes-
first condition (MCompare = 5.95 vs. MRate = 5.37; F(1,120) = 4.07, p < .05).  
Multi-stage moderated mediation analysis. Finally, we conducted a multi-stage mediated 
moderation analysis to examine whether the effect of task order on attribute variance under low-
level construal – but not under high-level construal – was mediated by an increase in the ratings 
of the unimportant attributes, and in turn mediated the effect of task order on decision 
satisfaction (that is, a task order  unimportant attribute ratings  overall attribute variance  
decision satisfaction causal path, significant only in the low construal condition). Bootstrapping 
mediation analysis (Hayes 2012), using 5000 samples with a 95% confidence interval (in 
brackets), suggested that the indirect effect of rating order on decision satisfaction, through 
unimportant attribute ratings and overall attribute importance variance, was significant under 
low-level construal (B = -.588, [-1.45, -.02]) but not under high-level construal (B = .009, [-.10, 
.23]). This confirms our mediated moderation hypothesis.   
 
Insert figure 3 about here
 
Discussion 
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The results of Experiment 4 underscore our theory by showing that the effect of 
comparisons on attribute variance was more pronounced under conditions that are known to 
increase tradeoff-making (i.e., low-level construal) and disappeared under conditions known to 
inhibit tradeoff-making and promote goal-directed behavior (i.e., high-level construal).  
Experiment 4 also rules out an alternative account according to which construal level 
alone was driving the effect. This alternative account would have predicted a main effect of 
construal level on attribute variance, but the results suggest that construal-level alone does not 
account for the effect.  
Finally, we repeated the procedure discussed in Experiment 3 to test whether changes in 
attribute importance ratings could have been driven by preference bolstering. Casting further 
doubt on this alternative account, neither task order nor construal level or their interaction 
influenced actual vs. predicted choice matching (all χ2(1) < 1, ns), and there was no effect of 
either factor on the difference between the best and second highest rated options (all F < 1, ns). 
Note that a preference bolstering account is also inconsistent with the fact that our effect was 
pronounced under low-level construal: preference bolstering is, by definition, goal directed, and 
therefore should be more likely under high level construal.      
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
People often find themselves struggling with decisions that seemed relatively simple at 
the outset. What toothbrush to buy or which flight to choose seem trivial in general, but they 
somehow become difficult when people actually face the choice options.  
This research suggests that one reason for this difficulty is that merely comparing multi-
attribute options can lead people to lose sight of what is important in the decision. While the 
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difference between important and unimportant attributes is often clear in the abstract, we suggest 
that the act of tradeoff-making itself can increase decision difficulty by making people perceive 
relatively unimportant attributes as more important. This shrinking attribute hierarchy increases 
decision difficulty (Bettman et al. 1998).  
Four experiments support this perspective. Across a variety of product categories, 
comparing multi-attribute options caused attribute importance variance to shrink due to an 
increase in the perceived importance of relatively unimportant attributes (Experiments 1-4). This, 
in turn, increased choice difficulty and uncertainty (Experiments 1 and 4).  
The results also illustrate that the effect is driven by the subjective perception of losses 
that tradeoff-making engenders. The effect was more pronounced when the visual layout 
encouraged within-attribute comparisons (Experiment 2) and under low-level construal 
(Experiment 4), which increases tradeoff-making and leads people to lose their goal-directed 
sense of what is important in the decision. The fact that the effect of tradeoffs disappeared when 
loss-aversion was attenuated through various manipulations (Experiment 3) supports our 
theorizing that the effect is driven by the perception of losses that tradeoff-making engenders. 
The experiments also cast doubt on a number of alternative accounts. First, the results 
rule out the possibility that the effect was merely due to the additional information that 
comparisons provide.  Even when the information remained the same across conditions, 
situational moderators like focus of attention, decreased loss aversion, and construal level 
moderated the effect (Experiments 2-4). Second, the studies cast doubt on an alternative account 
according to which the effect was due to construal-level by itself, regardless of tradeoff-making 
(Experiment 4).  
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Third, the experiments cast doubt on the possibility that changes in attribute ratings were 
driven by preference bolstering. In addition to the fact that attribute ratings did not support the 
preferred option (Experiments 3 and 4), preference bolstering cannot explain why attribute 
variance shrinkage made choice more rather than less difficult (Experiments 1 and 4), why it was 
driven specifically by unimportant rather than important attributes (Experiments 1-4), or why it 
was more pronounced under a within-attribute focus (Experiment 2), loss aversion (Experiment 
3), and low construal level (Experiment 4).  
 
Understanding Choice Difficulty 
A large body of work shows that choice can be difficult and fraught with regret due to 
factors that directly increase decision complexity and conflict, e.g., having too many options to 
choose from (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), excessive information (Jacoby, Speller, and Kohn 
1974), and conflicting tradeoffs (Tversky ad Shafir 1992).  
But in addition to these external sources of difficulty, more recent research shows that 
decision difficulty is often amplified by additional cognitive and motivational processes that 
arise once people start deliberating. The tendency for unique attributes to trigger excessive 
search, for example (Griffin and Broniarczyk 2010), or for people to artificially complicate 
important decisions that seem “too easy” (Schrift et al. 2011), both increase choice difficulty in a 
dynamic manner, with decision makers actively contributing to the increase. Unexpected 
difficulty may also lead people to infer that the decision is more important than initially believed, 
and consequently increase deliberation time and effort (Sela and Berger 2012a).  
This paper contributes to this burgeoning literature and deepens understanding of how 
these indirect processes increase decision difficulty, conflict, and uncertainty. In fact, one could 
expect these processes to have a mutually reinforcing impact. Lack of ideal point initially, for 
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example, may trigger people to expand their search, which in turn may inform them about non-
alignable attributes they desire, making realistic options seem unacceptable (Griffin and 
Broniarczyk 2010); the subjective feeling of losing that these within-attribute tradeoffs engender 
blurs the distinction between important and trifling decision dimensions (the current research); 
and the increased cognitive effort associated with all this unexpected processing may trigger the 
metacognitive inference that it is important to get the decision right, increasing deliberation 
further and culminating in a “decision quicksand” experience (Sela and Berger 2012a).    
 
Relation to Prior Research and Boundary Conditions 
While this work is related to other findings, it differs in some important ways. Prior work 
has shown that people may artificially inflate the weight of unimportant attributes to feel they 
have conducted “due diligence” (Schrift et al. 2011). But whereas this behavior occurs 
particularly in important decisions and when one option dominates (or almost dominates) other 
options in the choice-set, our perceptual process applies to the more common case where no 
dominant option exists and tradeoffs must be made, in both important and unimportant decisions 
(e.g., choosing a hypothetical toothbrush). Motivated choice complication should increase 
decision satisfaction, by providing people with the feeling that they achieved their information 
processing goal, but our effect decreased satisfaction. In sum, rather than competing with the 
choice complication paradigm, the current account applies to different situations and thus 
contributes to a more complete understanding of factors that increase decision difficulty.  
The current research is also different from prior work on “decision quicksand” showing 
that people use the extent of cognitive effort spent as a metacognitive indicator of decision 
importance (Sela and Berger 2012a). While it is possible that increased deliberation due to 
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tradeoffs could lead people to perceive the attributes as more important and thus contribute to 
our effect, such an account cannot explain the effect of loss aversion in Experiment 3. Further, 
metacognitive inference of importance from difficulty has been shown to occur when people 
expect the decision to be unimportant, but additional data we collected shows that the effect of 
tradeoffs is not sensitive to whether the decision is framed as important or unimportant.  
One may also wonder how our findings relate to prior research showing that people 
sometimes distort attribute weights in the pre-decisional phase in order to bolster an already 
preferred option, thereby decreasing decision difficulty and conflict (Brownstein 2003, for a 
review; Klayman 1995; Lord et al. 1979). There are a number of important differences between 
the current research and this prior work. First, while prior work on confirmation bias examined 
situations in which people already leaned toward one of the options (Chernev 2001; Lord et al. 
1979), our work investigates the common situation where no a priori preferences exist. Indeed, 
our findings may not apply when people have preexisting preferences that favor one of the 
options, or when choice is very simple such that tradeoffs can be resolved instantaneously.  
Second, prior research on pre-decisional distortion found preference bolstering when no 
prior preference existed, but they used a specific paradigm in which attributes were presented 
one at a time and participants were explicitly encouraged to state a preference or indicate which 
option was “leading” after seeing each additional attribute (Russo et al. 1998). Our studies 
examine the arguably more common situation where participants see all the information at once 
and are free to choose the order at which they consider the different attributes.  
Our work also relates to a number of other literatures. Multi-attribute choice theories 
(Johnson and Meyer 1984; Tversky 1972) predict that attribute processing would be more 
selective (i.e., fewer rather than more attributes are considered) when some of the attributes show 
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little or no variance. Attribute processing also tends to be more selective as the set size grows. 
Our effects may therefore diminish or even reverse when a subset of the attributes has no 
variance or when the choice set is very large such that it leads people to use simplifying 
strategies (Sela, Berger, and Liu 2009).   
Our research shows that attribute variance shrinkage increases decision complexity by 
leading people to consider additional attributes. Orthogonal to changes in complexity, however, 
an increase in the weight of trivial attributes can potentially make the options seem more 
polarized, thereby decreasing choice conflict. However, this would require (1) a specific choice-
set configuration where the trivial attributes favor a single option that is either leading or tied 
with other leading options; and (2) extensive deliberation, which is necessary for calculating the 
impact of attribute weight change on overall option utility (Bettman et al. 1998). Our effects may 
not apply under these conditions, to the extent that the positive impact of conflict reduction 
outweighs the negative impact of the increase in decision complexity.   
Further, contextual factors may attenuate the effect of tradeoffs on attribute importance 
variance. For example, formats that emphasize a small number of key attributes (e.g., price and 
average reviewer rating) and list additional, less important features (e.g., color options) in a 
separate section, may lead people to rely on those key dimensions at the expense of others, 
despite the presence of tradeoffs on other attributes.   
While one might wonder whether these effects are restricted to simultaneous presentation 
of options, an additional study shows that they can emerge even when the options are presented 
sequentially. Participants either compared four options presented one at a time and then rated 
attribute importance, or rated the attributes first and then compared the options one at a time (cf. 
Experiment 1). The results of this study replicate our main finding, illustrating that attribute 
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importance variance shrinks when consumers compare the options first, as opposed to first 
thinking about attribute importance.  
 
 Implications 
Considering the ubiquity of attribute descriptions, our results have important implications 
for marketing practice. Designers of conjoint analysis tests, for example, should recognize the 
impact of tradeoffs on perceived attribute importance. Prior conjoint research has focused on 
factors that directly increase task complexity and difficulty, such as the number of product 
attributes (De Shazo and Fermo 2002; Green and Srinivasan 1990). Our findings suggest that 
tradeoffs themselves can increase difficulty and distort attribute importance weights, which are at 
the heart of conjoint analysis. Bias is particularly likely when using presentation formats and 
decision frames that encourage low level, within-attribute processing (Experiment 2 and 4).   
The ideas examined here also have a number of important implications for consumer 
welfare. Given our findings that tradeoffs can have detrimental consequences for consumer well-
being (e.g., satisfaction), one might wonder how to mitigate these effects.  One simple approach 
is to remind oneself of which attributes are important prior to making the decision.  This should 
help inoculate consumers against shrinking attribute variance in the decision process itself, and 
the negative repercussions that come with it.  Alternatively, maintaining a higher level of 
construal also mitigated these effects (Experiment 4). 
The loss-based mechanism underlying the tradeoff effect may also provide insight into 
why social comparisons are often so painful: one reason is that they increase the perceived 
importance of trivial attributes with inferior (i.e., regrettable) values. Comparing features of 
one’s car to those of the neighbor’s car, for example, is likely to increase the perceived 
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importance of trivial attributes on which one’s own car is inferior without having an equivalent 
effect on superior attributes, due to the asymmetric tendency to weigh disadvantages more 
heavily than advantages.   
In closing, this research contributes to understanding choice difficulty. Making tradeoffs 
among attributes is an integral part of almost every decision.  But while it naturally involves 
some difficulty, by shrinking attribute hierarchy, tradeoffs can engender even more 
dissatisfaction.  
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APPENDIX A 
Choice Options Used in Experiment 1 
 
Flight Option 1 Flight Option 2 Flight Option 3 Flight Option 4 
Number of 
Stops 1 stop 2 stops 0 stops 1 stop 
Airport 
Location Relatively nearby Relatively nearby Somewhat distant Very distant 
Baggage Fee $25 No fee $20 $15 
Price $380 $320 $410 $350 
Overall 
Duration 6 hours 7 hours 5.5 6.5 
Aircraft  
Comfort Low Average Low High 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Layout Manipulation Used in Experiment 2 (Based on Wen and Lurie 2010) 
By-Attribute Condition (Flights): 
  Flight Option 1  Flight Option 2  Flight Option 3  Flight Option 4 
         
Connections  1 connection  Direct  2 connections  1 connection 
         
In-Flight 
Entertainment 
 G-rated movie  None  Recent Hollywood blockbuster 
 G-rated movie 
         
Price  $360  $450  $310  $380 
         
Food 
Selection 
 Pretzels, 
peanuts, and 
sodas available 
for purchase 
 Pretzels and 
peanuts available 
for purchase and 
a variety of free 
beverages 
 
Sodas available 
for purchase 
 Wide selection of 
free sandwiches 
and snacks, and a 
variety of 
beverages 
 
By-Option Condition (Flights): 
  Flight Option 1  Flight Option 2  Flight Option 3  Flight Option 4 
         
Connections  1 connection  Direct  2 connections  1 connection 
         
In-Flight 
Entertainment 
 G-rated movie  None  Recent Hollywood blockbuster 
 G-rated movie 
         
Price  $360  $450  $310  $380 
         
Food 
Selection 
 Pretzels, 
peanuts, and 
sodas available 
for purchase 
 Pretzels and 
peanuts available 
for purchase and 
a variety of free 
beverages 
 
Sodas available 
for purchase 
 Wide selection of 
free sandwiches 
and snacks, and a 
variety of 
beverages 
 
Control Condition (Flights): 
  Flight Option 1  Flight Option 2  Flight Option 3  Flight Option 4 
         
Connections  1 connection  Direct  2 connections  1 connection 
         
In-Flight 
Entertainment 
 G-rated movie  None  Recent Hollywood blockbuster 
 G-rated movie 
         
Price  $360  $450  $310  $380 
         
Food 
Selection 
 Pretzels, 
peanuts, and 
sodas available 
for purchase 
 Pretzels and 
peanuts available 
for purchase and 
a variety of free 
beverages 
 
Sodas available 
for purchase 
 Wide selection of 
free sandwiches 
and snacks, and a 
variety of 
beverages 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Attribute Importance Shift as a Function of  
Focus of Comparison (Experiment 2) 
 
                  
 
Note: error bars represent one standard error above and below cell mean. 
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Figure 2: Attribute Importance Variance as a Function of  
Task Order and Loss Aversion (Experiment 3) 
 
 
 
Note: error bars represent one standard error above and below cell mean. 
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Figure 3: Attribute Importance Variance as a Function of  
Task Order and Construal Level (Experiment 4) 
 
 
Note: error bars represent one standard error above and below cell mean. 
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